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NOTE
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE AFTER UNITED
STATES V. BARNES
INTRODUCTION
The peremptory challenge' in a criminal case,
while not protected by the Constitution, has been
declared by the Supreme Court to be .'one of the
most important rights secured to the accused.'
2
The peremptory challenge differs from the chal-
lenge for cause in that a challenge for cause is
based "on a narrowly specified, provable and le-
gally cognizable basis of partiality, 3 while a per-
emptory challenge may be "based on sudden
impressions and unaccountable prejudices." 4 It is
through peremptory challenges and challenges for
cause that the defendant is assured an impartial
jury as guaranteed by the sixth5 and fourteenth
amendments.6 An impartial jury is attained
through the exercise of these challenges by each
side removing jurors who sympathize with the
other side. This process hopefully will leave jurors
who are "indifferent.",
7
'The peremptory challenge has been defined as an
"arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
number ofjurors, without showing any cause at all" and
consequently, "without being subject to the court's con-
trol." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 n.9, 220
(1965).
2 Id. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 408 (1894)).
3 380 U.S. at 220.
4Id.
5 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI reads in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Irwin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961). Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure also guarantees the right to make peremptory
challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
Blackstone noted, as reasons for granting defendants
peremptory challenges, the desire for the accused to have
a good opinion of his jury by allowing a challenge for no
more than "bare looks and gestures of another" and the
desire to protect the defendant from jurors who have
been annoyed by the probing questions at voir dire. 4 W.
BLACMsTONE, COMMENTARIES* 353.
U.S. Asst. Att'y. Gen. Babcock notes an additional
reason for allowing peremptory challenges: the reluctance
of counsel to articulate a reason for striking ajuror In the
case where the challenge is based on the juror's ethnicity,
race, or religion. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "'Its 14on-
derful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553-54 (1975).
' Babcock, supra note 6, at 550-51.
While lawyers seek to obtain enough information
about each prospective juror through voir dire in
order to exercise their peremptory challenges intel-
ligently, the courts sometimes have countervailing
concerns. For example, courts may seek to prevent
what they regard as unnecessary intrusions into the
jurors' privacy.8 In addition, they may try to reduce
the possibility that a lawyer's probing questions
will annoy members of the jury or jeopardize the
jurors' impartiality.9 Finally, they may limit the
time spent on voir dire in order to avoid delay.'
0
Consequently, courts have sought means to con-
trol the questions asked on voir dire without deny-
ing defendants adequate use of their right to make
intelligent peremptory challenges. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
tried to maintain this delicate balance in United
States v. Barnes." In Barnes, the court held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion by refusing
to permit voir dire regarding the names, addresses,
ethnic backgrounds, and religions of prospective
jurors. 2
While the court appears to have followed the
trend of the case law with respect to peremptory
challenges, the opinion in Barnes has four weak-
nesses. First, with respect to counsel's request for
the name and address of each juror, the Second
Circuit should have required that the trial court
employ the least restrictive means available to the
court in maintaining the court's interest in ensuring
juror impartiality. Second, the court should have
found that defense counsel's request for the jurors'
residences was proper. This inquiry was relevant
for purposes of discovering a bias that had the
potenitial to affect the case at bar. Third, the court
appears to have taken the standard established by
8 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 135 (2d
Cir. 1979).
9 See id. at 144.
to See Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to
Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L.
REv., 1493, 1494 (1975).
" 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
12 Id. at 140-43. The panel consisted of Judges Moore,
Van Graafeiland, and Meskill. Judge Meskill filed a
dissenting opinion.
the Supreme Court for purposes of limiting the
questions asked on voir dire one step too far by
allowing trial judges to determine not only which
biases may be inquired into on voir dire, but also
the types of questions that may be used to ferret
out a particular bias. Finally, the Second Circuit
has placed itself in a difficult position by calling
into question the relevance of group biases in gen-
eral.
THE CASE
In United States v. Barnes, eleven defendants ap-
pealed their convictions of conspiracy to violate the
federal narcotics laws and of various substantive
offenses under those laws. One defendant had also
been convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm
during the commission of a federal felony, which
was also appealed.' 3 All of the defendants, except
for one Hispanic, were black.
During the voir dire,jurors were asked questions
regarding the county in which they resided, their
marital status, the number of children they had,
their occupation, their education, their affiliations,
if any, with the government or agencies thereof,
and other questions of this type.' 4 In addition,
jurors were asked about their attitudes towards
minority groups.' 5 However, the trial court refused
to ask questions regarding the name, address, eth-
nic background, and religion of each juror.
The defendants argued on appeal, inter alia,
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to ask questions regarding each prospective juror's
name, address, ethnic background, and religion.
The defendants conceded that the refusal to allow
questions regarding the names and addresses of
each juror was not, in and of itself, error. However,
13 Specifically, the defendants were convicted under
federal statutes 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 848 (1976) and 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1976).
14 604 F.2d at 135. In addition, jurors were asked
whether they had any feelings about undercover agents
that might prejudice them as jurors; whether they or
close friends or family had any prior experience with
narcotics or firearms that might bias them; whether they
had seen or read anything that would influence them;
and whether they had ever had any contact with any
individuals or places that would be referred to in. the
trial. Id.
15 Id. at 136. Examples of these questions were: "Have
you had any experience with any members of any race,
creed or color other than your own which has resulted in
any kind of civil or criminal confrontation in any Court
of Law?"; "Have you any experience at your place of
employment or residence or school which would make
you feel you could not fairly judge a person of a different
race, creed, or color?"
the defendants argued that the lack of this infor-
mation coupled with the court's refusal to allow
questions regarding the ethnic background and
religion denied the defendants the ability to exer-
cise their peremptory challenges intelligently and
thus denied them due process of law.'
6
The Second Circuit held that the trial judge had
not abused his discretion. First, the court noted
that the trial judge has broad discretion in con-
ducting voir dire. The court stated that in exercis-
ing this discretion the judge may refuse to ask
questions that are "too remote ' 'i 7 from the issues in
the case at bar, unnecessarily intrude into the
jurors' private lives, or have the potential of sub-
jectingjurors or their families to threats or physical
harm that might affect the jurors' impartiality.'
The court claimed that a defendant's rights are
given sufficient protection if the voir dire is "fair."
Fairness is achieved when the questions asked are
"designed to uncover bias among jurors as to issues
in the case and to the defendant himself."'19
Using the above criteria, the court addressed
more specifically the defendants' request for the
name, address, ethnic background, and religion of
each prospectivejuror. As to the trial judge's refusal
to allow questions regarding the names and ad-
dresses of the jurors, the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged that such refusal might not be appropriate
in every case.20 However, in the instant case, there
had been much pretrial publicity regarding the
reputation of the defendants who were considered
by the court to be "undeniably dangerous," and a
witness reportedly had been threatened. Conse-
quently, the trial court had felt a duty to protect
jurors and their families from physical harm or
threats that might impair their impartiality.
21
The court, apparently finding questions regard-
ing the ethnic background of the jurors "too re-
mote" from the issues in the case, responded to the
defendants' contention that those questions should
have been asked by noting that nothing indicated
'61d. at 133-34.
17 Id. at 140.
1
8 Id. at 139, 140-42.
'9 Id. at 140.
2
0 Id. at 141.
21 Id. at 136-37. The court specifically pointed to the
pretrial publicity concerning the defendants' violent acts
and to the history of violence in the Southern District of
New York in cases of this kind, concluding that -the
circumstances were such that the suggestion of disruption
was manifest." Id. at 141. See also id. at 137 n.7 (the court
noted that a potential government witness reportedly was
murdered on the eve of the trial's commencement at a
place that would have been referred to at trial).
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that persons of one ethnic background were "more
favorably disposed toward narcotic trafficking or
to using firearms" than those of another back-
ground.22 Moreover, regarding the value of know-
ing a juror's ethnic background for purposes of
assessing racial bias, the court felt that the ques-
tions the trial judge did ask regarding racial prej-
udice were sufficient, and thus fairness was
achieved without having to ask about ethnic back-
ground.
Taking a different approach with respect to
questions concerning the religion of each juror, the
court registered a concern for the jurors' privacy
by concluding that the "jury selections system was
not designed to subject prospective jurors to a
catechism of their tenets of faith."2 Furthermore,
jurors, according to the Second Circuit, might have
doubts about what religious or ethnic category they
fall into.22 The court was also concerned that if
jurors knew that their private lives would be in-
quired into on voir dire, persons might refuse to
serve as jurors.
2 5
In sum, the Second Circuit concluded that the
defendants had been provided enough information
to exercise their peremptory challenges intelli-
gently. The questions the trial court asked provided
ample information which defense counsel could
supplement through observing the demeanor of the
prospective jurors, their clothing, and their speech.
Questions regarding the ethnic background, reli-
gion, name, and address of each juror were either
"too remote" from the issues in the case or might
have prejudiced the jury. Thus, the trial court had
not abused its discretion by refusing to ask jurors
for this information.
26
Judge Meskill dissented, attacking the majority
for using what he termed a relevancy standard to
determine the types of questions that may be asked
on voir dire for purposes of exercising peremptory
challenges. Apparently concentrating on the
22 Id. at 140.
"3Id. at 141.
2 Id.
25Id. at 140.26 1d. at 140-43. A similar approach was used by the
court in United States v. Delval, 600 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.
1979). There the court held that the trial court should
look at whether the 'overall examination, coupled with
[the judge's] charges to the jury affords a party the
protection sought."' Id. at 1102-03 (quoting United
States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Additional support for the Barnes court's finding of "fair-
ness" was that two of the defendants were acquitted on
all charges and that defendant Barnes was acquitted on
three counts.
phrase "too remote," Judge Meskill stated that
only questions designed to ferret out actual bias,
those biases challenged for cause, may be controlled
by this relevancy standard. The peremptory, chal-
lenge on the other hand, pursuant to the Supreme
Court in Swain v. Alabama, may be exercised on
any grounds at all, even those that seem irrelevant
to the issues at bar. Thus, by definition, a court,
according to Judge Meskill, cannot refuse to ask
questions proffered for purposes of exercising per-
emptory challenges on the grounds that they are
irrelevant to the issues in the case. Consequently,
the defendants should have been permitted to





There is strong support for the court's position
that the trial judge may refuse to ask jurors to
disclose their names and addresses in order to
protect them and their families from threats that
might jeopardize their safety and their impartial-
ity. In Ham v. South Carolina,2 9 for instance, Justice
Marshall, concurring and dissenting, recognized
that questions asked on voir dire can be limited to
protect the state's countervailing interest of avoid-
ing jury intimidation.30 The Second Circuit in
United States v. Borelli,3' another narcotics case, sug-
gested the possibility of employing restrictions sim-
ilar to those employed in Barnes. During the course
of the Borelli trial, the jurors each received a letter
they interpreted as a threat. The court, finding no
need to reverse the convictions on this ground, still
noted, in dicta, that the incident demonstrated
"the need for precautions assuring that the ad-
dresses, and perhaps even the names, of jurors in
cases such as this will be held in confidence; courts
must protect the integrity of criminal trials against
this kind of disruption.
32
In taking such precautions, courts have taken
various steps to protect potential jurors from hav-
ing their privacy intruded upon by the press or
from being intimidated by defendants. The Sev-
27 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
22604 F.2d at 171-72.
2 409 U.S. 524 (1973). The defendant in Ham, arrested
for possession of marijuana, was a bearded black man
active in civil rights.
3 Id. at 533 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
31 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 id. at 392.
1980]
enth Circuit in United States v. Hoffa33 held that a
trial judge's order, mandating that the names of
potential jurors not be disclosed until voir dire, was
proper. The court recognized that while 28 U.S.C.
§ 1864 states that the drawing of a petit jury must
be public, it does not require that the names of the
jurors be read aloud. It was obvious to the court
that the trial judge was concerned about potential
jury tampering, and, therefore, the extra precau-
tion was warranted.3a
More akin to the precautions taken by the Barnes
court were those taken in Wagner v. United States.
35
There the trial court allowed jurors to state only
the approximate community in which the juror
resided and refused to permit counsel to ask each
juror his name either before or during voir dire.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that enough infor-
mation had been elicited on voir dire to enable
counsel to exercise its peremptory challenges intel-
ligently.
3 6
It should be noted, however, that while the state
in Barnes did have a vital interest in protecting
jurors from threats or physical harm, the defend-
ants were deprived of important information, es-
pecially with respect to the residence of each juror.
For instance, without this information it was im-
possible for defense counsel to ascertain whether
jurors resided in the area of the crime and thus
knew of the participants involved in the case at
bar.3 7 Moreover, if a prospective juror lived in the
general vicinity of a social club frequented by the
defendants and central to the case against the
defendants and knew that the club had a reputa-
tion in the neighborhood for being a meeting place
for criminal figures, that juror was potentially
biased. However, without knowing the address of
the juror, defense counsel had no way of knowing
whether the juror was lying about his familiarity
with the places or characters involved in the case.
Finally, a juror's neighborhood might have indi-
cated something about ethnic background and
economic status.
as
Because information about jurors' residences
3 367 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 1966), vacated on other
grounds, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
4 367 F.2d at 710.
35 264 F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936
(1959).
36 264 F.2d at 527.
37 See Defendants' Joint Reply Brief at 11, United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
BuIger v. McCloy, 575 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1979)).
Interview with E. Chikovsky, attorney for defendant
Barnes. See also Defendant's Joint Reply Brief at 11.
would have helped defense counsel eliminate po-
tentially prejudiced jurors, the court in Barnes
should have considered whether the trial judge
could have preserved thejury's privacy, safety, and
impartiality while still supplying the defendants
with as much of the information requested as
possible. This notion that a court must employ the
least restrictive alternative when attempting to
protect one right at the expense of others was
adopted by the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stewart.3" There the Court struck down
a trial judge's restrictive order that attempted to
preserve an impartial jury by prohibiting the press
from reporting on admissions or confessions of the
accused as well as other "strongly implicative"
facts.40 The Court stated that in determining
whether the "evil" of pretrial publicity justified the
invasion of free speech, one had to determine
whether other measures would have been likely to
protect the defendant's right to an impartial jury,
short of an order restraining all publication."
Using the least restrictive alternative approach,
the Barnes court could have required the trial judge
to inquire into the approximate community of each
prospective juror, as did the Ninth Circuit in Wag-
ner v. United States.12 Knowing a juror's neighbor-
hood would provide at least some information as
to the area in which the juror lived and some
possible information about the juror's ethnic back-
ground and economic status. 43 A second alternative
would have been for the court to voir dire the jury
in camera, with only the attorneys present. This
procedure of closing the pretrial proceedings from
the public with the consent of the defendant was
specifically cited by the Court in Nebraska Press
Association as a way to insure an impartial jury,
short of restraining all publication by the press.4 4
In the instant case, such a procedure would have
39 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
4 Id. at 567-68.
41 Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
42 264 F.2d 524, 527 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959).
43 For instance, a juror who resides in the borough of
Manhattan might actually live in Greenwich Village,
Murray Hill, the Upper East Side, or Harlem, to name
only a few of Manhattan's neighborhoods. The socioeco-
nomic makeup of these neighborhoods varies a great deal
and "knowing that someone is from Manhattan does not
give counsel contemplating the same insight" as knowing
he is from some specific Manhattan neighborhood.
United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.
1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
" See 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
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maintained an impartial jury without unduly cur-
tailing defense counsels' right to ask general back-
ground questions on voir dire.
THE RELEVANCY TEST AND ITS MISAPPLICATION
IN BARNES
Not only did the Second Circuit fail to apply the
least restrictive alternative standard, it also appears
to have applied a relevancy test in limiting the
questions to be asked on voir dire.4" As pointed out
by Judge Meskill in his dissent, it is debatable
whether this test should be applied to those ques-
tions asked for purposes of exercising peremptory
challenges.
In coming to this conclusion, Judge Meskill re-
lied heavily on Swain v. Alabama where the Supreme
Court held that the striking of blacks from a jury
in a particular case, through the exercise of per-
emptory challenges, was not a denial of equal
protection of the law.46 In so holding, the Court
recognized that peremptory challenges frequently
are exercised on grounds irrelevant to the legal
issues in the case at hand, including race, religion,
nationality, occupation, or affiliation.47 Given the
fact that the grounds for exercising a peremptory
challenge may be irrelevant to the legal issues in
the case, it could be argued that the questions
asked for purposes of exercising this challenge like-
wise may be irrelevant to the issues in the case.
However, the scope of the questioning on voir
dire is not limitless. Under the relevancy standard
developed by the Court in Ham v. South Carolina4s
and Ristaino v. Ross,49 the bias sought to be probed
by the attorney's questions during voir dire must
rise to a constitutional level and be "inextricably
bound up in the case." °
In Ham, the Court held that under the facts in
that cases' it was a constitutional error not to
inquire whether any of the jurors were prejudiced
against blacks. It was not, however, a constitutional
45 604 F.2d at 142.
46380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965). The Court continued,
however, by stating that when a prosecutor systematically
removes all blacks from every jury so that blacks would
never sit on juries, there might be an equal protection
violation. Id. at 223-24, 227.47 Id. at 220.
4 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
49 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
50 Id. at 597; 409 U.S. at 527-28.
51 In Ham, a black man was arrested for possession of
marijuana. The defendant claimed that he was framed
by the police. He considered the fact that he was black
and active in civil rights a motive for the police to frame
him in this manner. 409 U.S. at 525.
violation to refuse to inquire into potential preju-
dice against men with beards.52 The Court rea-
soned that compelling an inquiry into racial prej-
udice was supported by the Court's decision in
Aldridge v. United Stateso and the words and pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment. An inquiry
into prejudice against men with beards had neither
the precedential support nor the constitutional un-
derpinning to support such an inquiry. Thus, the
Court could not single out this particular prejudice
from a "host of other similar prejudices" and hold
that the Constitution required that such an inquiry
be undertaken on voir dire.5
In Ristaino, the Court held that the Constitution
did not always require voir dire regarding racial
prejudice. The Court stated that it is only where
the "circumstances ... suggest a significant like-
lihood that racial prejudice might infect [the] trial"
that the Constitution requires inquiry into racial
prejudice.H Thus, in Ristaino, while the defendant
was black and the victim white, the Court could
not find that the trial judge erred in not inquiring
about racial prejudice on voir dire. Juxtaposing
Ristaino with Ham, the Court noted that defendant
Ham's defense to his drug charge was that his race
and civil rights activities gave the police a motive
for framing him.5 Race did not play a similar role
in the Ristaino trial. It was not, in the Court's words,
"inextricably bound up in the case."
57
Lower courts too have used this relevancy
standard to limit the types of prejudices that a trial
court must inquire into on voir dire. For instance,
the Third Circuit in Virgin Islands v. Felix5s deter-
mined that the defendant's concern over the pos-
sibility that jurors, who once had resided on one
island, being prejudiced against the defendant who
was a native of a different island was not worthy
of inquiry on voir dire. The court reasoned that the
alleged bias was "unfocused and diffuse."5 9 The
court in United States v. Robinson0 took a somewhat
52 Id. at 527-28.
' 283 U.S. 308 (1931). In Aldridge, the Court held that
in a case where the victim was white and the defendant
was black, it was improper for the trial court not to
inquire about racial prejudice on voir dire. The Court
later noted in Ristaino that the basis for the decision in
Aldridge was not the Constitution but the Supreme
Court's supervisory power over federal courts. 424 U.S.
at 597 n.9.
'4 409 U.S. at 527-28.
s 424 U.S. at 598.
6 Id. at 595-97.
7 id.
s 569 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978).
59 Id. at 1277.
60 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1980]
similar approach while upholding the trial court's
decision to deny the defendant's request to question
jurors on their views of self-defense. The court
noted that racial prejudice and some other biases
have become recognized by the courts as "proper
subjects" of inquiry on voir dire.6 ' When, however,
the bias sought to be inquired into on voir dire falls
outside of this group, the court required that the
''proponent ... lay a foundation for his question
by showing that it is reasonably calculated to
discover an actual and likely source of prejudice,
rather than pursue a speculative will-o-the wisp."
62
Therefore, while the Supreme Court in Swain
wanted to avoid subjecting peremptory challenges
to judicial "scrutiny for reasonableness and sincer-
ity,' ' 3 courts, in fact, have moved in this direction.
As shown, the trial court may limit the biases
explored to those that rise to a constitutional level
and are "inextricably bound up in the case" or to
those biases that have been recognized as "proper
subjects" for inquiry on voir dire as the court in
Robinson concluded. Thus, a trial court also may
limit the voir dire to those questions which direct
themselves at constitutionally or judicially recog-
nized biases. Consequently, while an attorney still
may strike a juror for any reason at all, any bias
that cannot be articulated and thereby recognized
as a proper subject for voir dire need not be in-
quired into.6
61 Id. at 381. Those biases are: (1) race, where the case
carries racial overtones; (2) matters about "which either
the local community or the population at large is known
to harbor strong feelings"; and (3) where there is police
testimony, persons tend to attach "disproportionate
weight" to such testimony. Id.
6 Id. at 381; accord, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
at 533 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"3380 U.S. at 222.
United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1979). The Gibbons court noted that while an attorney
need not give a reason for exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge, "that can hardly mean that every question sug-
gested by counsel must be put by the trial judge because
it might conceivably lead to a peremptory challenge." Id.
at 1051. But see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), where
the court specifically rejected the claim that only ques-
tions directed at those prejudices which may be chal-
lenged for cause need be asked on voir dire. In Dellinger,
the "Chicago Seven," convicted under the federal antiriot
statute, 18 U.S.C § 2101 (1976), argued on appeal that
the voir dire for their trial was so "perfunctory" with
respect to the jurors' attitudes about patriotism and the
defendants' values that they were denied due process of
law. Note, however, that Dellinger was decided before
Ham and Ristaino. In Barnes, the court pointed out that
the Seventh Circuit in Dellinger found that the trial judge
abused his discretion because he refused to inquire about
Under this test, however, the Second Circuit
appears to have erred. First, the trial court should
have asked each juror's address because this infor-
mation might have alerted counsel that a particu-
lar juror might be aware of the defendants' crimi-
nal reputations or might know that a place men-
tioned at trial had a reputation in the community
as being frequented by criminals.65 A juror's famil-
iarity with the persons or places involved in the
case at bar certainly would not constitute cause for
the juror's removal. This would be true especially
if the juror indicated that he was impartial.6 How-
ever, given such familiarity, it might be appropri-
ate for counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge,
thereby removing that juror. Thus, this bias should
have been recognized by the Barnes court. Under
the test established in Robinson, it should have been
clear to the trial court that familiarity with a
defendant's reputation or the reputation of a place
mentioned at trial was "an actual and likely source
of prejudice." Moreover, such a bias is not a general
bias "unfocused and diffused" as was the bias in
Felix.
67
The second way in which the Second Circuit in
Barnes appears to have erred was by giving the trial
judge new, unwarranted discretion with respect to
voir dire. Following Ham, Ristaino, and Robinson,
trial courts may limit the questions asked on voir
dire to those that inquire into biases that rise to a
constitutional level and are "inextricably bound
up in the case" or that have been recognized by
the courts as "proper subjects" for voir dire. Prior
case law also has stated that the form of the
questions and the number of questions that may
be asked are within the trial court's discretion.6
Barnes went beyond these precedents, however, by
allowing the trial judge to decide what types of
questions may be used to ferret out a particular
bias.
For instance, in Barnes, racial prejudice was a
concern of both defense counsel and the court.6 9
The questions asked by the court regarding racial
prejudice were straightforward in that they in-
quired about "bad experiences" with minorities or
whether the jurors would admit to being racially
issues which "touched on the character of the defendants
themselves" and because politics "would surely inject
themselves into the deliberation." 604 F.2d 138 n.9.
ss See text accompanying note 38 supra.
6' See generally Babcock, supra note 6, at 550.
67 569 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1975); see text accompanying
note 58 supra.
s See 409 U.S. at 527.
69 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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prejudiced.70 Questions regarding ethnic back-
ground and religion were considered by the Second
Circuit to be "too remote" from the issues in the
case.
71
To the extent that questions regarding a juror's
ethnic background could have aided counsel in
uncovering racial prejudice, the court stated that,
"Whatever prejudice may be shared by members
of an ethnic group as to black persons would have
been uncovered by the questioning about attitudes
toward blacks.",72 Thus, the court appears to have
allowed the trial judge to determine what types of
questions are appropriate for ferreting out racial
prejudice.
The Second Circuit repeated this philosophy in
United States v. Gibbons,73 another narcotics case
decided soon after Barnes. In Gibbons, the trial court
only disclosed the names of the jurors and the
borough ajuror resided in within New York City.74
The Second Circuit held that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by refusing to ask the
specific address of each juror. In dicta, the court
stated that a trial judge will abuse his discretion
only by "utterly ... foreclos[ing] a line of inquiry
necessary to lay the groundwork for peremptory
challenges" with respect to a prejudice that is a
"proper subject" for inquiry on voir dire.75 Thus,
it appears that as long as the trial judge asks some
questions with respect to the "properly recognized"
bias, he does not abuse his discretion by not asking
other questions proffered by the attorney.
One can see the problem of allowing courts to
limit the type of question used to ferret out a given
bias. For instance, in Barnes, information about the
jurors' ethnic background, religion, and neighbor-
hood was important in assessing racial prejudice.
since jurors often will not admit to a bias.70 As one
commentator has noted, "[c]ommon human expe-
rience, common sense, psychosociological studies,
and public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that
certain classes of people statistically have predis-
positions that would make them inappropriate ju-
rors for particular kinds of cases." 77 Moreover, as
70 id.
7' 604 F.2d at 140.72
1id.
73 602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1979).
74 Id. at 1050.
75 1d. at 1051.
76 See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 367,
where the court stated: "We do not believe that a pro-
spective juror is so alert to his own prejudices."
77 Babcock, supra note 6, at 553. See also Note, note 10
supra; Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation
of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
the Supreme Court noted in Swain, the question for
counsel is "not whether ajuror of a particular race
or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one
from a different group is less likely to be."78 Thus,
in Barnes, information regarding a juror's neigh-
borhood, ethnic background, or religion might
have provided additional information that would
have been helpful in assessing ajuror's unconscious
bias or in weighing a juror's disclaimer of such a
bias. Questions that inquire about a prejudice in
as straightforward a fashion as those asked in Barnes
would not ferret out this information.
79
The above, however, assumes that group biases
are relevant in assessing whether a particular juror
might be prejudiced. With respect to racial preju-
dice, the court in Barnes appeared to acknowledge
the relevance of ethnic background and religion,
but found that the questions the trial court did ask
on the subject were sufficient to uncover that bias. 0
However, the Second Circuit does not appear ready
to acknowledge the relevancy of group biases with
respect to a particular prejudice in every case. The
Second Circuit appears to require that the attorney
submitting a question, whose relevance to a partic-
ular bias rests on the recognition of group biases,
provide empirical data establishing that such a
group bias does exist. In Barnes, the court rejected
the defense counsel's request for information re-
garding the ethnic background of each juror by
noting, in part, that there was "nothing to indicate
that persons of one ethnic type or another are more
favorably disposed toward narcotic trafficking or
to using firearms." 8' Thus, the court appears to
stand ready to assess the validity of a public opin-
ion poll or a psychological study. There is no way,
however, for the court to judge the validity of a
psychological study or a public opinion poll. The
court simply is not qualified for such a task. Most
judges are not schooled in statistics or psychology.
Nor could a court rely on other statisticians or
psychologists since social scientists often disagree
with each other's findings. Therefore, group biases
should be judicially recognized,8 2 and information
requested for purposes of assessing group biases
should not be denied where counsel submits at
least one poll or study indicating the existence of
such a group bias.
78 380 U.S. at 220-21.
7
9See note 15 supra.
so 604 F.2d at 140.
s Id.
82 In Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass.
1979), and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 358, 583 P.2d
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1978), the courts recognized the
existence of group biases.
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Courts instead might concentrate on the degree
to which the question intrudes on the jurors' pri-
vacy. Questions regarding a juror's religion or eth-
nic background are limited intrusions that will not
stigmatize a juror nor demand intimate details of
the juror's life. Thus, it is difficult to justify the
court's refusal to inquire into the jurors' religion
and ethnic background when that decision is
weighed against the defendants' right for an im-
partial jury.
CONCLUSION
There appear to be several weaknesses in the
Second Circuit's decision in Barnes. First, the court
should have used the least restrictive alternative
approach to balance the jurors' need for protection
against counsel's need for the information associ-
ated with each juror's name and address. Accepting
the fact that the jurors required protection, the
court could have refused to allow counsel to inquire
as to the name of the juror, but could have allowed
inquiry as to his neighborhood. Without a name,
it would be very difficult to find someone who lives
in a specific New York City neighborhood. The
neighborhood of ajuror would give defense counsel
an idea of the juror's ethnic background or eco-
nomic and social status. Both of these factors might
help to determine whether a particular group bias
might be useful in discovering a prejudice that has
been judicially recognized as a proper subject for
voir dire. Moreover, knowing the neighborhood of
a juror would allow an attorney to infer whether
or not the juror was familiar with the persons or
places involved in the case, perhaps harboring
certain prejudices, even if the juror disclaimed such
prejudices.
Second, there is the question about whether
ethnic background, religion, and neighborhood
were proper inquiries under the facts of this case.
A court need not ask any questions unless they are
directed at a prejudice that both rises to a consti-
tutional level and is "inextricably bound up in the
case" or, as noted by the courts in Robinson and
Gibbons, is judically recognized as a proper subject
for inquiry on voir dire. Under this test, however,
it appears that inquiring about a juror's neighbor-
hood for purposes of ascertaining the juror's famil-
iarity with the persons and places intertwined in
the case, was proper.
More important, however, is the manner in
which the court appears to allow judges to limit
the types of questions used to ferret out a particular
bias. Given that the court in Barnes recognized
racial prejudice as a proper subject for inquiry on
voir dire, the trial court should not have been
allowed to dictate what types of questions were
most effective in ferreting out that bias. The Su-
preme Court in Ham and Ristaino never gave trial
courts that type of control over the voir dire. By
allowing trial courts to limit the types of questions
used by counsel to ferret out a bias, the Second
Circuit has run the risk that the voir dire will fail
to discover unconscious or unadmitted biases.
Finally, with respect to group biases in general,
the Second Circuit requires attorneys to present
empirical evidence to establish that a particular
group bias actually exists. Courts, however, are not
capable of assessing the validity of group biases
and therefore should acknowledge their existence
and validity if counsel can submit some empirical
proof of their existence. Courts instead should con-
centrate on the degree to which a particular ques-
tion intrudes into the private lives of the jurors in
determining the question's pertinence.
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